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The Collapse of the Harm Principle Redux  
 
On Same-Sex Marriage, the Supreme Court’s Opinion in United States v. Windsor, John 
Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty (1859), and H.L.A. Hart’s Modern Harm Principle 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt1   
 
Introduction 
 
In an article published in 1999, titled ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle,’2 I argued that 
the harm principle, originally articulated in John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty (1859), had 
collapsed under the weight of its own success and no longer serves, today, as a limiting principle 
on the legal enforcement of morality. The widely-perceived triumph of the harm principle over 
legal moralism, I argued, produced a proliferation of harm arguments across the political 
spectrum, including among proponents of legal enforcement; given that the harm principle is a 
limiting principle and does not contain a criterion to evaluate non-trivial harms, nor to adjudicate 
between competing claims of non-trivial harms, the hegemonic success of the harm principle and 
the resulting proliferation of harm arguments effectively eviscerated the ability of the harm 
principle to limit the legal regulation and punishment of morality.  
 
Several commentators raised forceful questions about the relationship between Mill’s 
essay and the harm principle, as well as about the continuing vitality of Mill’s argument in On 
Liberty.3 In this article, I return to my original argument to draw an important distinction and to 
clarify a central point.  
 
First, the distinction: Although Mill first articulated, in the ‘Introductory’ to On Liberty, a 
simple harm principle focused on the basic notion of ‘harm to others,’ Mill went on to develop 
and elaborate over the following chapters of On Liberty a far more intricate theory about the 
protection of certain interests and legal rights—express and customary legal rights—in order to 
advance his ethical vision of individualism, diversity, creativity, and human self-development, 
grounded on a utilitarian approach. Mill’s fully articulated theory in On Liberty must be 
distinguished from Mill’s early statement of a simple harm principle focused on the basic notion 
of ‘harm to others.’  
 
Second, then, the clarification: Liberal legal thinkers at the mid-twentieth century, 
especially H.L.A. Hart, but others as well such as Joel Feinberg and Herbert Wechsler, drew on 
Mill’s early statement of a simple ‘harm to others’ principle to develop the modern harm 
1 Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Chicago. Special thanks to Guyora Binder, 
Alan Brudner, Marc DeGirolami, Markus Dubber, Klaus Günther, Mia Ruyter, Simon Stern, Mariana Valverde, and 
Anders Walker for insightful comments on this essay; and to Daniel Henry for excellent research assistance.   
2 B Harcourt, ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle,’ 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109 (1999); see also B E 
Harcourt, Illusion of Order (2001). 
3 For a review of this debate, see A Duff, ‘Theories of Criminal Law,’ Section 6 ‘Crimes as Public Wrongs,’ The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2013 Ed.), E N Zalta (ed.), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/criminal-law/.   
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principle, which they deployed successfully in the debate with modern legal moralists, such as 
Lord Devlin, over prostitution, homosexuality, and the legal enforcement of morals. As a result, 
it is Hart’s modern harm principle, focused on the basic notion of ‘harm to others’ and ‘human 
suffering,’ that triggered a proliferation of harm arguments and ultimately collapsed the modern 
harm principle, not Mill’s fully articulated theory of protected interests and legal rights. 
Although, as Anders Walker has shown,4 there was already a turn back to the simple notion of 
‘harm to others’ in the nineteenth century, it was only after the liberal legal thinkers at the mid-
twentieth century seized on the early ‘harm to others’ language from Mill’s introduction to On 
Liberty that there would be a proliferation of non-trivial harm arguments across the political 
spectrum, and ultimately the collapse of the modern ‘harm to others’ principle. As for Mill’s 
fully articulated theory of legal rights associated with his Humboldtian vision of human self-
development, that aspect of Mill’s essay has had relatively little influence on modern criminal 
law and on contemporary debates over the legal enforcement of morality5, and it is therefore 
difficult to assess the continuing vitality of Mill’s elaborated theory in On Liberty.   
 
With this distinction and clarification in mind, the argument of The Collapse of the Harm 
Principle can be slightly restated and, I believe, continues to shed light on ongoing contemporary 
debates over the legal regulation of morality: today, the hegemony of the modern harm principle 
continues to generate a proliferation of non-trivial harm arguments on both sides of the debates, 
and the competing claims of non-trivial harms have effectively neutralized the critical, limiting 
function of the modern harm principle. The proliferation of harm arguments has given rise to a 
cacophony of harms that can only give rise to what I would call ‘harm decisionism’—i.e. 
political decisions about which harms are more compelling than others and crude, intuitive 
utilitarian calculi about minimizing social harms. But on those matters, the modern harm 
principle does not perform a limiting function. Once the modern harm principle has been 
satisfied by a claim of non-trivial harm, the decision whether to legally enforce morality 
becomes, in essence, a harm free-for-all in which the victor is usually the one who makes the 
most compelling and popular claim of injury—which, paradoxically, may lead precisely to the 
kind of demagoguery and mass appeals that Mill tried to rein in with his elaborate theory of 
interests and legal rights in On Liberty.  
 
In this article, I demonstrate the continued vitality of the collapse of the modern harm 
principle argument by exploring the recent United States Supreme Court decision on same-sex 
marriage—a context involving a civil, not a criminal prohibition on behavior that is viewed by 
some as immoral. United States v. Windsor6 involved a challenge to the constitutionality of 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defined marriage for purposes of 
federal law as the union between a man and woman—thereby excluding legal same-sex 
marriages conducted in States that allow such marriages from the federal definitions of 
4 A Walker, ‘Strange Traffic: Sex, Slavery, and the Freedom Principle,’ working draft presented at the University of 
Chicago (2013) 19-20. 
5 As Joseph Hamburger correctly pointed out, this may be attributable in large part to the fact that so many 
contemporary commentators have not focused on the crucial passages in On Liberty in which Mill argued for legal 
restrictions on self-regarding conduct. See J Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control (1999) 180-184. 
6 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. __ (2013). 
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‘marriage’ and ‘spouse.’ Insofar as DOMA enacts a moral objection to same-sex marriage, 
DOMA should be conceived here as a federal legal prohibition on same-sex marriage, in other 
words as the legal enforcement of morals.  
 
From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor reflects perfectly the 
collapse of the modern harm principle. Notice, first, that DOMA was enacted because of a 
conservative harm argument about the potential injuries that same-sex marriages may cause to 
traditional marriage and the family. DOMA itself reflects the proliferation of harm arguments 
and the turn to harm by social conservatives. The statute, after all, was called the defense of 
marriage act: Congress (and President Bill Clinton) were defending traditional marriage from the 
potential harm that same-sex unions could have on heterosexual marriage and on the traditional 
family. The legislative history from the House of Representatives reflects this well and 
explicitly: the House Report states that ‘it is both appropriate and necessary for Congress to do 
what it can to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage.... H.R. 3396 is 
appropriately entitled the “Defense of Marriage Act.” The effort to redefine “marriage” to extend 
to homosexual couples is a truly radical proposal that would fundamentally alter the institution of 
marriage.’7 Justice Samuel Alito, in his dissenting opinion in Windsor, gives voice to what he 
clearly considers to be potential non-trivial harms: ‘The family is an ancient and universal human 
institution,’ Alito writes in Windsor.8 ‘Family structure reflects the characteristics of a 
civilization, and changes in family structure and in the popular understanding of marriage and 
the family can have profound effects.’ These changes, Alito emphasized, can have ‘far-reaching 
consequences.’ Alito warns: ‘We can expect something similar to take place if same-sex 
marriage becomes widely accepted. The long-term consequences of this change are not now 
known and are unlikely to be ascertainable for some time to come.’ Alito added in a footnote that 
‘As sociologists have documented, it sometimes takes decades to document the effects of social 
changes—like the sharp rise in divorce rates following the advent of no-fault divorce—on 
children and society,’ and Alito cited a study about the ‘Unexpected Legacy of Divorce.’ Alito is 
clearly referencing potential non-trivial harms: harms to children and society potentially 
equivalent to those (purported real harms) associated with no-fault divorce.   
 
Second, these potential harms of same-sex marriage satisfy, and thereby neutralize the 
modern harm principle. Let me spell this out step-by-step: the conservative moral position, in 
this context, is that same-sex marriage is morally wrong. On this basis, a legal moralist would 
argue that there should be a prohibition on same-sex marriage—or, in other words, that DOMA 
should be upheld since it represents a prohibition on immoral conduct. The modern harm 
principle would state that same-sex marriage can only be prohibited—i.e. DOMA should only be 
upheld—if same-sex marriage causes ‘harm to others.’ Inversely, the modern harm principle 
would disallow DOMA if same-sex marriage causes no ‘harm to others.’ But given that the 
legislation is based on a claim of non-trivial harm, the modern harm principle cannot function 
here as a limiting principle to strike down DOMA. The modern harm principle cannot limit the 
prohibition on same-sex marriage—it cannot strike down DOMA—precisely because the 
traditionalists have turned to harm as well. And what is fascinating about the Supreme Court 
7 H R Rep No 104–664 (1996) 12-13, quoted in Windsor, __. 
8 Windsor (J. ALITO, dissenting), 570 U.S. __.  
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liberal majority in Windsor is that not a single justice takes the position that same-sex marriage 
causes no potential harm to others. Faced with the conservative harm argument, all of the 
justices defer to the political process on the question whether same-sex marriage causes harm to 
others. No one on the Court is prepared to say that Section 3 of DOMA should be struck down 
because same-sex marriage does not cause harm to traditional marriage or the family, and that 
morals enforcement does not satisfy reasonable basis review (as the Court announced in 
Lawrence). As a result, the modern harm principle has been neutered by the proliferation of 
conservative harm arguments.  
 
Third, rather than argue that same-sex marriage causes no harm, the liberal thinkers on 
the Supreme Court ratchet up the harm, and outdo the conservative harm arguments: they double 
the harm, by claiming an even greater harm. That greater harm, according to the liberal thinkers 
on the Court, is the injury that Congress (and President Clinton) inflicted on same-sex couples by 
enacting DOMA. Just as H.L.A. Hart would argue that the prohibition on homosexual sodomy 
does greater harm than the harm of sodomy itself, just as the drug legalization lobby would argue 
that the War on Drugs does more harm than drug use, the liberals on the Court pile on more harm 
arguments: ‘the principal purpose and the necessary effect of this law,’ Justice Kennedy writes 
for the majority, ‘are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex marriage.’9 DOMA, 
Kennedy writes, ‘brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples. It raises the cost of 
health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their workers’ same-
sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and 
parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.’10 The opinion is all about harms. In 
his usual way, Justice Scalia, in dissent, offers a succinct restatement of the liberal majority’s 
harm arguments: ‘the majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with malice—with the 
“purpose” “to disparage and to injure” same-sex couples. It says that the motivation for DOMA 
was to “demean;” to “impose inequality;” to “impose ... a stigma;” to deny people “equal 
dignity;” to brand gay people as “unworthy;” and to “humiliat[e]” their children (emphasis 
added).’11 In effect, the liberal response to the conservative harm arguments is to double the 
harm and to ratchet things up—which, incidentally, succeeds.  
 
Fourth, what we are left with in Windsor is a rather typical harm free-for-all: a cacophony 
of harm claims that the modern harm principle—which is intended to be a limiting principle—
cannot resolve. As a limiting principle, the harm principle cannot adjudicate between these 
competing non-trivial harm arguments. Instead, we are forced to resort to ‘harm decisionism’: 
we have to decide which harm is more important to us and then act accordingly. That is precisely 
what happened at the Supreme Court. Now, to be sure, the Supreme Court did not apply the harm 
principle: this was constitutional adjudication and the legal question was whether DOMA’s 
Section 3 violates equal protection or due process under the U.S. Constitution. But the majority 
in effect did take sides in the harm competition: Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority does 
ultimately hold that it is the harm to same-sex couples that violates equal protection: ‘The 
9 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. __ (emphasis added).  
10 Ibid. (emphasis added) 
11 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. __ (J. SCALIA, dissenting).  
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Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” justify disparate treatment of that group.’  
 
Now, you might respond that the harm principle prevailed in Windsor either (1) because 
the majority prohibited morals legislation on the ground that DOMA itself caused ‘harm to 
others,’ or (2) because the Supreme Court was focused on the issue of harm—perhaps net harm 
or overall harm—and that, basically, is what the harm principle is all about, i.e. about avoiding 
overall net harm. But neither of those responses are consistent with the modern harm principle.  
 
The first response turns the modern harm principle on its head and completely inverts the 
logic: the majority did not address the harm of the underlying behavior, rather the harm of the 
morals legislation. But of course morals legislation is going to cause harm. It is intended to cause 
harm. It is intended to prohibit certain behaviors that are deemed, and in the process labeled or 
stigmatized, as immoral. All morals legislation is going to cause that kind of harm. The 
criminalization of incest or bestiality causes harm by punishing persons who engage in that 
behavior and labeling them as immoral. What the modern harm principle is all about is avoiding 
that kind of harm if the underlying conduct does not cause harm to others. The harm principle is 
premised on the assumption that legal enforcement causes harm. But that secondary harm is 
simply not a problem for the harm principle once it is established that the underlying conduct 
causes ‘harm to others.’ For instance, prohibiting polygamy causes harm to polygamists and 
labels them as criminal and immoral. In fact, it is intended to do them harm and disrupt their 
families, send them to prison and punish them. But the harm principle is silent about all of that 
secondary harm, so long as the principle is satisfied, i.e. so long as it is the case that polygamy 
causes harm to others. The first response simply fails to appreciate that all regulation, 
criminalization, punishment, and legal enforcement of morality causes harm to the targets of 
enforcement, and therefore that there will always be an argument to strike down prohibitions 
because they cause harm. But it is not an application of the harm principle to strike down morals 
legislation because the legislation causes harm—that is assumed; it is only the job of the harm 
principle to strike down morals legislation if the underlying conduct does not cause harm to 
others. The first response, in other words, is all inside out: it incorrectly takes the premise as the 
principle.  
 
The second response—namely that the harm principle continues to do work at the level of 
overall, net harm—completely misconstrues the modern harm principle: the harm principle is a 
limiting principle that is intended to shield behavior that does not harm others. It is not the 
equivalent of the larger utilitarian principle that legislation should minimize social harm or 
maximize social utility. Once there exists ‘harm to others,’ conduct is no longer shielded by the 
harm principle and the harm principle does no more work. And once you have gotten past the 
limiting effect of the harm principle, then any number of rules of decision could apply. To say 
that overall net harm becomes the most important factor in deciding whether to legislate does not 
mean that the harm principle has triumphed, it simply means that society has adopted a utilitarian 
calculus focused on maximizing well-being. It is just plain utilitarianism. And it is not required 
by, it does not implicate, and it is not even akin to the limiting harm principle. Society could, just 
as easily or reasonably, adopt the harm principle and beyond that, a rule of thumb that young 
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people decide: in other words, if behavior causes harm to others (if it satisfies the harm 
principle), it can be prohibited, but society decides whether to prohibit based on a survey of 17 to 
19-year-olds. There could be any number of rules of decision whether to prohibit behavior once 
the limiting harm principle has been satisfied and the behavior is deemed to cause harm to 
others. To try to maximize happiness in society by minimizing the amount of social harm and 
human suffering is orthogonal to the modern harm principle—which states only that conduct 
should not be prohibited unless it causes ‘harm to others.’  
 
In sum, the modern harm principle has prevailed over legal moralism, but its victory and 
the resulting proliferation of prohibitionist harm arguments have sapped the modern harm 
principle of any limiting function on the legal enforcement of morals. Let me begin, then, with 
the first and important distinction between John Stuart Mill’s elaborate rights theory in On 
Liberty and the modern harm principle. 
 
I. John Stuart Mill On Liberty (1859) 
 
‘That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over 
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm 
to others.’12 
 
This simple sentence from John Stuart Mill’s ‘Introductory’ to On Liberty—pulled out of 
context and denuded of Mill’s sophisticated philosophical treatment—became a foundational 
reference of Anglo-American criminal law and helped shape the course of penal legislation, 
enforcement, and theory during the twentieth century. Known as the ‘harm to others’ principle—
or ‘harm principle’ for short—Mill’s simple sentence emerged, in the hands of H. L. A. Hart, 
Joel Feinberg, Herbert Wechsler, and other liberal legal thinkers at mid-century, as the critical 
principle used to shield individuals from the legal enforcement of morals legislation—including, 
most notably, penal laws against homosexual conduct, commercial sex, illicit drugs, and other 
behaviors that came to be known as ‘moral vices’ for some and ‘victimless crimes’ for others. 
‘Harm to others’ became, in the 1970s and 1980s, the defining criteria of liberal thinkers in the 
debate over the proper scope of the criminal law and the legitimate reach of the State—as 
evidenced, perhaps most notably, by the lead volume of Feinberg’s magisterial and influential 
treatise on The Moral Limits of Criminal Law, titled ‘Harm to Others,’ published in 1984. 
As Mill himself had recognized in his sophisticated analysis of the ‘harm to others’ 
language in later chapters of On Liberty, however, the simple notion of ‘harm to others’ was far 
too crude a criterion to withstand the pressure of majority opinion—far too vulnerable to the 
rhetorical ploys and charismatic interventions that shape mass public sentiment—which was 
precisely what Mill was trying to rein in. The advent of liberal democracy in the nineteenth 
century, Mill explained in framing On Liberty, had raised a new set of concerns, not only about 
representation, but also about ‘social tyranny.’13 In the emerging liberal democracies, Mill wrote, 
the problem was no longer, or not only to protect against ‘the acts of the public authorities,’ but 
12 J S Mill, On Liberty, E Rapaport (ed.) (1978) 9. 
13 Ibid. 4.  
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also to guard against the tidal wave of public opinion that could so easily encroach on 
individuality and self-development: ‘Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate 
is not enough; there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and 
feeling, against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own 
ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them…’14 Mill was rather 
explicit in his criticism of public opinion, which, he observed, ‘now rules the world’ and reflects 
‘the tendencies and instincts of the masses,’ which he expressly equated with ‘collective 
mediocrity.’15  
Mill was by no means opposed to liberal democracy, to majority rule, nor to the 
extension of suffrage—in fact, he was an outspoken advocate of women’s suffrage and defended 
universal suffrage16—but he was deeply concerned about the potential impact of mass popular 
opinion on individualism. He did not resist, but sought instead to mediate the emerging defects 
of the more generalized suffrage by refining democratic theory. And he did so, in part, by 
advocating leadership by the more enlightened few: 
‘I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a 
general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the 
government of mediocrity from being mediocre government. No government by a 
democracy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its political acts or in the opinions, 
qualities, and tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could rise above mediocrity 
except in so far as the sovereign Many have let themselves be guided (which in their best 
times they always have done) by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and 
instructed one or few. The initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come 
from individuals; generally at first from some one individual.’17 
From this perspective, evidently, the simple notion of ‘harm to others’ was a notion that 
was particularly susceptible to mass appeal—precisely the kind of emotional and populist 
rhetorical flourish that could be slapped on to any behavior and lead to improper government 
intervention. Left to the devices of the masses, ‘harm to others’ could potentially result in the 
most oppressive restrictions on individual self-development.  
II. On Liberty: From ‘Harm to Others’ to Legal Rights and Duties 
On this ground, Mill would develop gradually, over the course of his essay On Liberty, a 
far more refined principle to limit interference with individual liberty. At first, Mill would 
qualify the ‘harm to others’ language by specifying that only those acts can be proscribed which 
do harm to others ‘without justifiable cause.’18 At this initial stage, Mill would emphasize that 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., 63.  
16 J S Mill, Public and Parliamentary Speeches, regarding the Reform Bill of 1866, 31 May 1866, 85-86, in J S Mill, 
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, J M Robson (ed), Volumes 28-29 (1963); see generally J S Mill, The 
Subjection of Women (1869).  
17 Ibid., 63. 
18 Ibid., 53 (emphasis added). 
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the individual ‘must not make himself a nuisance to other people’19: he must ‘refrain[] from 
molesting others in what concerns them, and merely act[] according to his own inclination and 
judgment in things which concern himself…’20 Mill developed and elaborated a first distinction 
between self-regarding and other-regarding acts—between ‘the part of a person’s life which 
concerns only himself and that which concerns others.’21  
But here too, Mill acknowledged that the plain distinction between self and other-
regarding acts would not hold up, without more. ‘I fully admit,’ Mill conceded, ‘that the mischief 
which a person does to himself may seriously affect, both through their sympathies and their 
interests, those nearly connected with him and, in a minor degree, society at large.’22 And when 
self-regarding mischief has such effects on others, or on society at large, Mill declared, it must 
be ‘taken out of the self-regarding class.’23 Mill went even further, arguing that the mere risk of 
affecting others could render legitimate legal prohibition: ‘Whenever, in short, there is a definite 
damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the case is taken out 
of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law.’24  
Further elaboration and refinement of the distinction would lead Mill to focus on notions 
of interests, rights, and duties: the simple ‘harm to others’ principle would have to be embedded 
in a far more robust theoretical structure of legal rights and obligations. And so, in his later 
statements of the limiting principle, Mill framed the notion of harm within a liberal structure of 
recognized legal rights. Mill declared that individuals had a duty ‘to observe a certain line of 
conduct toward the rest,’ and that society ‘is justified in enforcing [this duty] at all costs to those 
who endeavor to withhold fulfillment.’25 The line of conduct in question was to be understood 
through the lens of legal rights: namely, it consisted ‘first, in not injuring the interests of one 
another, or rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit 
understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each person’s bearing his share 
(to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labors and sacrifices incurred for defending the 
society or its members from injury and molestation.’26 
In framing the ‘harm to others’ principle through the lens of express and customary legal 
rights, Mill drew on the foundations of liberal thought. The liberal strand in modern political 
thought had woven together, from a very early date, the notions, on the one hand, of obstructing 
the movement or interests of others with, on the other hand, the idea of legal rights. In the 
Leviathan, Hobbes had defined liberty as the very ‘absence of Opposition,’ and opposition as 
‘externall Impediments of motion.’27 More importantly, Hobbes characterized civil laws as 
‘hedges’ intended to protect citizens from the harmful consequences of the actions of others. As 
Hobbes explained, ‘the use of Lawes, (which are but Rules Authorised) is not to bind the People 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. (emphasis added).  
21 Ibid. 78. 
22 Ibid. 79. 
23 Ibid. 79.  
24 Ibid. 80.  
25 Ibid. 73. 
26 Ibid. 73. 
27 T Hobbes, Leviathan, R Tuck (ed.) (1996) 145-147.  
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from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt 
themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not to 
stop Travellers, but to keep them in the way.’28 These hedges, Hobbes argued, ‘are a necessary 
means of the safety and well being of Man in the present World.’29 Locke as well borrowed the 
image of hedges to describe law, referring to laws as what ‘hedges us in . . . from Bogs and 
Precipices.’30 He too defined liberty in terms of both legal rights and interference from others: 
‘For Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others which cannot be, where there is 
no Law.’31 These early liberal definitions reflected the close nexus between legal rights and the 
potential harm of infringing conduct—or, more simply, the basic liberal liberty principle, namely 
‘that people should be able to live their lives as they choose without interference from others so 
long as they are not preventing others from doing the same.’32   
Mill did not elaborate in On Liberty the exact contours of the express and customary legal 
rights that would undergird the ‘harm to others’ principle; but he would provide enough 
illustrations in the ‘Applications’ chapter of his famous essay to suggest an outline. A good 
sense, then, can be gleaned from the following list of legitimate government prohibitions and 
regulations:  
1. It is legitimate to forbid and punish marriage between two consenting individuals if 
they cannot establish that they have sufficient financial means to support a family, 
because of the negative effect of overpopulation on the return to labor for ‘all who 
live by the remuneration of their labor.’33 In Mill’s words, such laws prohibiting 
marriage ‘are not objectionable as violations of liberty’ because they prohibit ‘a 
mischievous act’ that is ‘an act injurious to others…’34  
2. It is acceptable to forbid and punish idleness ‘in a person receiving support from the 
public’35 or if, as a result of that idleness, an individual fails to support their children 
or otherwise fails to perform their legal duties to others.36 
3. It is proper to impose ‘a moderate fine’ on a father if his child is unable to read at a 
public examination, because it is a duty of a parent to ensure that their child be able 
‘to perform his part well in life toward others and toward himself.’37 To fail to do so 
is ‘a moral crime, both against the unfortunate offspring and against society.’38 As 
Mill explained, the way to enforce his vision of education was through ‘public 
28 Ibid. 239–240. 
29 T Hobbes, Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, J Cropsey (ed.) 
(1971) 58; see generally M M Goldsmith, ‘Hobbes on law’ in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, T Sorell (ed.) 
(1996) 291. 
30 J Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P Laslett (ed.) (1988) 305. 
31 Ibid. 306; see generally P Laslett, ‘Introduction’ to Two Treatises of Government (1996) 112. 
32 I M Young, Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy, and Policy (1997) 9.  
33 Ibid. 107. 
34 Ibid. 107. 
35 Ibid. 97. 
36 Ibid. 97. 
37 Ibid. 104. 
38 Ibid. 104. 
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examinations, extending to all children and beginning at an early age;’ and if the 
examination revealed that the child was not able to read, ‘the father, unless he has 
some sufficient ground of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate fine, to be 
worked out, if necessary, by his labor, and the child might be put to school at his 
expense.’39  
4. It is legitimate to prohibit and punish drunkenness for any individual ‘who had once 
been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink’ or who 
has a propensity or risk of violence to others while drunk, because ‘The making 
himself drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others, is a crime 
against others.’40 
5. It is appropriate to mandate and use the criminal sanction to enforce a mandate that a 
seller of a substance that is poisonous label the substance ‘with some word expressive 
of its dangerous character…’; or to require that a seller of ‘articles adapted to be 
instruments of crime,’ such as firearms presumably, ‘to enter in a register the exact 
time of the transaction, the name and address of the buyer, the precise quality and 
quantity sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and record the answer he 
received.’41 
6. It is legitimate for the State to impose restrictions on ‘dealers in strong drinks’ to 
make sure that they do not promote ‘intemperance;’42 also, to tax stimulants, such as 
alcohol, ‘up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing 
that the State needs all the revenue which it yields)’ and to regulate the sale of such 
commodities by means of licensing, hours regulation, and ‘to withdraw the license if 
breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of 
the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing 
offenses against the law.’43  
7. It is legitimate to prohibit and punish acts that are ‘a violation of good manners,’ such 
as ‘offenses against decency,’ if they are done in public, because when they are done 
publicly they are ‘offenses against others.’44 
Evidently, Mill justified a large number of regulations and penal prohibitions on the basis 
of his rights framework. The theoretical structure, in Mill’s own hands, produced a blueprint for 
a highly regulated society: a society that restricted procreation and regulated education, 
prohibited public intoxication and indecency, regimented the sale of firearms and other potential 
39 Ibid. 105. 
40 Ibid. 96-97. 
41 Ibid. 96. 
42 Ibid. 99.  
43 Ibid. 100.  
44 Ibid. 97. 
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instruments of crime, taxed the sale of alcohol and regulated its consumption. The risk of future 
injury to protected interests or legal rights justified all forms of intervention.45  
Many theorists have observed this apparent paradox in Mill’s writings—the curious 
juxtaposition of a liberty principle with so many intrusions into the family and private, 
consensual behavior.46 Some have attributed it to a deeper contradiction in early liberal thought. 
Sheldon Wolin, for instance, in Politics and Vision, traces the apparent paradox in Mill’s work 
back to Hobbes and an early liberal failure ‘to grasp the interconnections between social and 
political forces’—to grasp, in effect, ‘the extent to which political practices were shaped by 
social relationships.’47 Early liberal thought, Wolin argues, focused on the purely political—
namely, on questions of authority and superintendence of rulers, of obligations and duties of 
citizens, and of the proper system of rules governing behavior—at the expense of the social 
realm. The development of liberal thought during the next three centuries, Wolin suggests, 
involved the gradual erosion of this distinctively political realm, and the rediscovery of society. 
But the vision of the social realm which was gradually reintroduced into liberal thought was 
overly idealized—even among those, such as Mill, who had a critical eye for the ‘mediocrity’ of 
the masses and of public opinion.  
Even in someone like Mill, Wolin contends, this produced a certain ‘blindness to social 
coercions.’48 Although Mill, more than others, resisted the oppression of public opinion and 
conformity, Wolin argues, Mill nevertheless fell back on the power of society to regulate human 
conduct. ‘The same Mill who had accused Comte of aiming at “a despotism of society over the 
individual,” who had welcomed de Tocqueville’s profound analysis of social conformity,’ Wolin 
emphasizes, ‘nevertheless proposed that the tyranny of opinion be invoked in order to promote 
some of his own pet causes’—the problem of overpopulation, the policy of open balloting, and 
the benefits of communal ownership.49 Even Mill, who was more vigilant than most in this 
respect, nevertheless succumbed to this liberal blindness: ‘Mill failed to understand fully the 
threat of social conformity.’50 As Wolin explains: 
‘In retrospect the long journey from private judgment to social conformity appears as the 
desperate effort of liberals to fashion a substitute for the sense of community that had 
been lost. For what liberalism had thought it had solved, it had only exposed as a 
problem.... They had conceived the issue as one of reconciling freedom and authority, 
and they solved it by destroying authority in the name of liberty and replacing it by 
society, but only at the cost of exposing freedom to society’s controls. To the nineteenth 
45 For a discussion of the relationship between legal rights and the harm principle in contemporary accounts, see H 
Stewart, ‘The Limits of the Harm Principle,’ 4 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2010) 18-20.  
46 For a defense of Mill, see D Spitz, ‘Freedom and Individuality: Mill’s Liberty in Retrospect,’ Nomos IV ed. C J 
Friedrich (1962) 195.  
47 S Wolin, Politics and Vision (1960) 287.  
48 Ibid. 349.   
49 Ibid. 349. See also J Hamburger, John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Control (1999) 9-17.  
50 Ibid. 350.  
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and twentieth centuries fell the task of stating the problem more correctly: not freedom 
versus authority, or Man against the State, but authority and community.’51   
In order to make sense of this apparent paradox in Mill’s writings, though, I think it is 
important to recognize that Mill’s entire theoretical intervention was aimed at enhancing a 
particular vision of human self-development. It was directed toward a goal of individual growth 
and self-development—as commentators have noted.52 For Mill, the notions of protected 
interests and legal rights were inextricably linked to the virtues of individualism and individual 
growth reflected in the maxims of Wilhelm von Humboldt, which Mill quoted extensively and 
with great praise in the body of his essay: ‘the end of man, or that which is prescribed by the 
eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the 
highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.’53 
This is the idea that Mill would enshrine as the very epigraph to On Liberty—again, citing 
Humboldt: ‘The grand, leading principle, towards which every argument unfolded in these pages 
directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest 
diversity.’54 
This is by no means a new insight, but it does serve to make sense of the apparent tension 
in Mill’s thought. The scholarship on Mill’s moral and political philosophy has certainly 
emphasized the centrality of self-development. As Alan Ryan suggests, ‘Mill’s concern with 
self-development and moral progress is a strand in his philosophy to which almost everything 
else is subordinate.’55 In Happiness, Justice and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy 
of John Stuart Mill, John Berger refers to the doctrine of self-development as ‘the most important 
and distinctive feature of [Mill’s] work.’56 Berger claims that, ‘[i]n writing about On Liberty, it is 
clear that [Mill] viewed the essay as asserting (what I regard as) a powerful, somewhat 
innovative, positive doctrine . . . of the importance to human well-being of individual self-
development, or, as I prefer to call it, autonomy.’57 Focusing on Mill’s complex views of the 
good, Wendy Donner reaches a similar conclusion in The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral 
and Political Philosophy.  Donner writes that ‘Mill’s most fundamental commitment, the driving 
force of all his thought and writing, is the promotion of human self-development and the 
happiness involved in the development and exercise of our higher human faculties’ and refers to 
this as ‘the positive defense of the right to liberty of self-development....’58 The connection 
between this overarching objective—well recognized—and the specific outcomes of Mill’s 
51 Ibid. 350-351. 
52 F R Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (1984) 
229-230; A Buchanan, ‘Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,’ 99 Ethics (1989) 862; W Donner, 
The Liberal Self: John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy (1991) 188-97; R Hittinger, ‘The Hart-Devlin 
Debate Revisited,’ 35 American Journal of Jurisprudence (1990) 51–52. 
53 W von Humboldt, The Sphere and Duties of Government, quoted in Mill, On Liberty (1978) 55.  
54 Ibid., epigraph.  
55 A Ryan, The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (1988) 255. See also G Kateb, ‘A Reading of On Liberty,’ in On 
Liberty by John Stuart Mill, eds. David Bromwich and George Kateb (2003) 66.  
56 Berger (1984) 229. 
57 Ibid. 229. 
58 Donner (1991) 3; Ibid. 191; see also Hittinger (1990) 51-52. 
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analysis in his ‘Applications’ chapter, though, is precisely what can make sense of the structure 
of protected interests and legal rights that Mill had in mind.  
 The notion of legal rights embodied in Mill’s more elaborated restatements of the 
limiting principle rested on a utilitarian calculus intended to maximize the diversity, creativity, 
and self-development of individuals.59 Mill emphasized: ‘I forego any advantage which could be 
derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right as a thing independent of utility. I regard 
utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.’60 The utilitarian element 
would infuse not only the definition of legal rights, but also the method of assessing, after a 
violation of right is identified, whether the criminal sanction was appropriate.61 And Mill did not 
believe that the numerous regulations that he justified would infringe on the self-development of 
humankind, because, in Mill’s opinion, the regulations promoted the interests of a more noble 
and artistic self.62 Restrictions on activities like drinking did not present a threat to human self-
development, but rather promoted a healthier and more noble individual and society.63  
In the end, Mill substituted for the ‘harm to others’ principle a far more intricate liberty 
principle that depended on a robust definition of express and customary legal rights constructed 
in order to promote the ideal of individual self-development in its richest diversity. 
‘Encroachment on their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own 
rights, Mill argued, ‘these are fit objects of moral reprobation and, in grave cases, of moral 
retribution and punishment.’64 In his final articulation of the ‘two maxims which together form 
the entire doctrine of this essay,’ Mill made clear that he had developed an elaborated theory of 
legal interests and rights: 
‘The maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions in 
so far as these concern interests of no person but himself…. Secondly, that for such 
actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable and may 
be subjected either to social or to legal punishment if society is of opinion that the one or 
the other is requisite for its protection.’65 
 Mill himself was not particularly focused on or vested in the implications for the criminal 
law, and had far greater ambitions than penal reform. His was a political and moral philosophy 
aimed at a larger contribution to democratic theory and governance. To be sure, Mill’s essay On 
Liberty would immediately engage and provoke jurists, especially the British barrister and judge, 
Lord James Fitzjames Stephen. In 1873, in a book entitled Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, Stephen 
would publish a scathing attack on Mill’s essay and strenuously advocate legal moralism as a 
59 Mill (1978) 10.  
60 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
61 Ibid. 73. (‘As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has 
jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it 
becomes open to discussion.’) 
62 See Hamburger (1999) 190. 
63 See, e.g., Mill (1978) 60. 
64 Ibid. 76 (emphasis added).  
65 Ibid. 93 (emphasis added). 
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principle to justify government enforcement of morals legislation.66 Stephen described his 
argument as ‘absolutely inconsistent with and contradictory to Mr. Mill’s,’67 and his argument 
was best captured in a now-famous passage: ‘[T]here are acts of wickedness so gross and 
outrageous that, self-protection apart, they must be prevented as far as possible at any cost to the 
offender, and punished, if they occur, with exemplary severity.’68 But Mill’s ambition was far 
greater than to intervene simply in the criminal law. It was to develop a more encompassing 
utilitarian framework to advance a conception of individuality, of creativity, of diversity, and of 
individual differentiation and self-development—in Mill’s words, ‘to see that it is good there 
should be differences.’69   
III. The Modern Harm Principle: The Road Back to the Simple Notion of Harm 
Although Mill fully recognized that the simple notion of ‘harm to others’ would not 
withstand scrutiny, nor the test of time, a century later the debate would focus on that very issue 
of ‘harm to others’ and—as Mill would have predicted—the early, simplified ‘harm to others’ 
principle would collapse under the weight of its own success. It collapsed over the course of the 
second half of the twentieth century, as more and more participants in the debate over the legal 
enforcement of morals legislation, on both sides of the debate, would turn to harm-based 
arguments in order to persuade public opinion—what Mill feared. After a momentary triumph of 
the simple ‘harm to others’ principle, primarily due to its simplicity, the gradual proliferation and 
accumulation of social harm arguments, without a limiting principle to adjudicate between 
claims of harm, would ultimately render the modern harm principle useless—or worse, a mere 
rhetorical ploy.  
The problem, it seems, originated with H. L. A Hart, who would almost single-handedly 
focus the debate back onto the simple notion of ‘harm to others.’ Hart’s intervention was sparked 
by a series of events in England and the United States: in England, the Committee on 
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (the ‘Wolfenden Report’) had recommended that private 
homosexual acts between consenting adults no longer be criminalized and discussed at length the 
privacy interests in consensual commercial sex but the problems associated with public 
solicitation and street prostitution; in the United States, the Supreme Court was struggling over 
the definition and treatment of obscenity, and the American Law Institute was drafting a Model 
Penal Code and rethinking the criminalization of ‘vice crimes.’70 In both countries, liberal 
thinkers believed that legal moralism, along the lines of Stephen’s arguments in Liberty, 
Equality, Fraternity, was experiencing a rejuvenation and threatening to encroach on liberal 
ideals. More than anyone else, Lord Patrick Devlin catalyzed this perceived threat. In his 
Maccabaean Lecture, delivered to the British Academy in 1959, Devlin argued that purportedly 
immoral activities, like homosexuality and prostitution, should remain criminal offenses.71 
66 J F Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1967); see also M DeGirolami, ‘The Punishment Jurist: James 
Fitzjames Stephen,’ Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (1873), in this volume. 
67 Stephen (1967) 162. 
68 Ibid. 162. 
69 Ibid. 71. 
70 R Dworkin, ‘Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals,’ 75 Yale Law Journal 986 (1966) 986-87; T C Grey, 
The Legal Enforcement of Morality (1983) 4.  
71 P Devlin, Patrick, ‘Morals and the Criminal Law’ in Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1965).  
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Devlin published his lecture and other essays under the title The Enforcement of Morals and soon 
became associated with a renewed principle of legal moralism—namely, that moral offenses 
should be regulated because they are immoral, regardless of whether they infringe on legitimate 
interests in the Millian sense. 
In Law, Liberty, and Morality, a set of lectures delivered at Stanford University in 1962 
in response to Devlin, Hart squarely addressed the debate over the enforcement of morals: ‘the 
subject of these lectures,’ Hart declared, ‘concerns the legal enforcement of morality and has 
been formulated in many different ways: Is the fact that certain conduct is by common standards 
immoral sufficient to justify making that conduct punishable by law? Is it morally permissible to 
enforce morality as such? Ought immorality as such to be a crime?’72 And right after posing the 
subject his lectures, Hart immediately cited Mill, but refocused the entire debate on the narrow 
question of harm to others: 
‘To this question John Stuart Mill gave an emphatic negative answer in his essay On 
Liberty one hundred years ago, and the famous sentence in which he frames this answer 
expresses the central doctrine of his essay. He said, “The only purpose for which power 
can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilised community against his will is 
to prevent harm to others.’’’73  
Hart rehearsed and embraced Mill’s limiting principle, but carefully and deliberately 
pared the argument down to its original, simple, succinct, and crude statement regarding ‘harm.’ 
Notice the emphasis on that single ‘famous sentence,’ reproduced in full, alone, without further 
development: the core of Mill’s doctrine, Hart maintained, was the notion of ‘harm to others.’ 
Hart did not refer his listeners to the later elaborations of the limiting principle, which Mill 
himself had referred to as ‘the entire doctrine of this essay.’74 Hart referenced only the first crude 
articulation.  
In this and subsequent passages, Hart would reduce Mill’s argument to the ‘harm to 
others’ language. Hart endorsed the simple harm argument, and declared that, ‘on the narrower 
issue relevant to the enforcement of morality Mill seems to me to be right.’75 Throughout his 
lectures, Hart would constantly and repeatedly oppose the notion of ‘immorality’—the basis of 
the legal moralist argument—to the fact that the underlying conduct is ‘not harmful to others’ or 
involves no ‘suffering.’76 Hart reduced the complexity of Mill’s essay, reiterating, throughout, 
72 H L A Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (1963) 4.  As many commentators recognized, the ensuing Hart-Devlin 
debate would replicate in many ways the contours of the debate a hundred years earlier. See L B Schwartz, ‘Morals 
Offenses and the Model Penal Code,’ 63 Columbia Law Review 669 (1963) 670 n.1. 
73 Ibid. 4 (emphasis added).  
74 Mill (1978) 93.  
75  Hart (1963) 5. Hart qualified his endorsement insofar as he supplemented the harm principle with an offense 
principle. It is not clear, however, that Mill would have disagreed with Hart, since the Millian notion of other-
regarding conduct seems to embrace both the harm principle and the offense principle.  
76 Hart (1963) 5; see also ibid. 5 (‘I myself think there may be grounds justifying the legal coercion of the individual 
other than the prevention of harm to others’); ibid. 25 (‘to suppress practices condemned as immoral by positive 
morality though they involve nothing that would ordinarily be thought of as harm to other persons’); ibid. 33 
(‘harming others is something we may still seek to prevent by use of the criminal law, even when the victims 
consent to or assist in the acts which are harmful to them’); ibid. 34 (‘forms of immorality which involve no 
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‘Mill’s own principle that coercion may be justifiably used to prevent harm to others.’77 Hart’s 
focus was narrowly on harm—which would, predictably, undermine the very principle 
advanced.78  
In a somewhat similar way, the liberal philosopher Joel Feinberg, in an essay entitled 
Moral Enforcement and the Harm Principle published in 1973, would embrace Mill’s argument, 
but he too would pare the limiting principle down to its original, simplified formulation focused 
on harm to others.79 Feinberg distinguished between direct and indirect harm, but did not go 
much further, at the time, in developing the notion of harm at the heart of the limiting principle.80 
Feinberg endorsed the simple harm principle and wrote that the distinction, ‘as Mill intended it to 
be understood, does seem at least roughly serviceable, and unlikely to invite massive social 
interference in private affairs.’81 Feinberg published the first volume of The Moral Limits of the 
Criminal Law, tellingly called Harm to Others, eleven years later in 1984. Feinberg analyzed and 
elaborated on the harm principle, developing fifteen supplementary criteria which he called 
‘mediating maxims’ to assist in the application of the ‘harm to others’ principle.82 But even by 
the end of his four-volume treatise, Feinberg had remained wedded to the basic harm principle, 
concluding his treatise with the following definition of liberalism: ‘we can define liberalism 
cautiously as the view that as a class, harm and offense prevention are far and away the best 
reasons that can be produced in support of criminal prohibitions, and the only ones that 
frequently outweigh the case for liberty.’83 The original, simplified harm principle—focused on 
harm to others—remained, even by the end of Feinberg’s treatment, one of the two main limits 
on state regulation of moral offenses.  
IV. The Rise and Fall, and the Eventual Collapse of the Simple Harm Principle 
 In an article titled ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle,’84 I traced a history of the harm 
principle, demonstrating how the return to a crude notion of ‘harm to others’ in the work of Hart, 
Feinberg, and other liberal theorists originally succeeded, at least at a rhetorical level, in 
defeating the renewed legal moralist arguments at mid-century; how the simple harm principle 
then became dominant in Anglo-American criminal law and theory; how moral prohibitionists 
suffering to any sentient being’); ibid. 34-35 (‘an instrument for the prevention of suffering or harm’); ibid. 40 
(‘harms to individuals which the criminal law may properly seek to prevent by punishment’); ibid. 40 (‘are harms to 
individuals which the criminal law may properly seek to prevent by punishment’); ibid. 53 (‘crimes obviously 
harmful to others’); ibid. 65 (‘especially when applied to conduct not harmful to others’) 
77 Ibid. 46 (emphasis added) 
78 As D.G. Brown writes, in attempting to dissociate ‘the Devlin advocacy of enforcing accepted morality’ from 
Mill’s thesis, Hart abstracts Mill’s argument from the text such that ‘one cannot even tell whether Hart would agree 
with Mill’s thesis or not.’ ‘Mill on Liberty and Morality’ 81 The Philosophical Review 2 (1972) 147 n.7. 
79 J Feinberg, ‘Moral Enforcement and the Harm Principle’ (from Social Philosophy (1973)) reprinted in ETHICS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY, T Beauchamp (ed.) (1975). 
80 Ibid. 284. 
81 Feinberg 1975:286. Feinberg also supplemented the harm principle with an offense principle. See id. at 297; see 
also 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO OTHERS 49 (1985). 
82 J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (1984) 214–17; 243–45 
83 J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing (1988) 323. 
84 B Harcourt, ‘The Collapse of the Harm Principle,’ 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109 (1999); see also B E 
Harcourt, Illusion of Order (2001). 
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then turned to harm arguments in order to support their legal moralist positions; and how, as a 
consequence, the simple harm principle collapsed under the weight of its own success and 
eventually no longer provided a limiting principle to the exercise of the government’s power to 
punish. Rather than repeat the argument here, I will simply summarize its four steps with some 
slight revisions.   
1. Triumph: Over the period 1960-1980, Hart’s restatement of the simple ‘harm to 
others’ principle (which I will henceforth refer to as ‘the modern harm principle’) 
began to dominate the legal philosophic debate over the enforcement of morality. 
Most prominent theorists who participated in the debate either relied on the modern 
harm principle or made favorable reference to the argument.85 As Robert George, 
who many might characterize as a legal moralist, acknowledged, ‘many . . . perhaps 
even most [commentators] think that Hart carried the day . . . .’86 Jeffrie Murphy, who 
is today a skeptic of the harm principle, captured well the prevailing consensus at the 
time: ‘I believed, along with most of the people with whom I talked about legal 
philosophy,’ Murphy wrote, ‘that legal moralism had been properly killed off, that 
liberalism had once again been vindicated against the forces of superstition and 
oppression, and that legal philosophy could now move on to new and more important 
topics.’87  
2. Hegemony: As the modern harm principle began to dominate the legal philosophic 
debate, most of the leading criminal law scholars either adopted the modern harm 
principle or incorporated it in their writings.88 This was reflected most clearly in the 
drafting of the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute, which was begun in 
1952 and completed in 1962. Herbert Wechsler, the chief reporter and intellectual 
father of the Model Penal Code, strongly endorsed harm as the guiding principle of 
criminal liability: conduct, Wechsler wrote, ‘is not deemed to be a proper subject of a 
penal prohibition’ unless it ‘unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens 
substantial harm . . . .’89 This was, Wechsler emphasized, ‘a declaration designed to 
be given weight in the interpretation of the [Model Penal] Code.’90 As a result, 
throughout the Model Code and the Comments, the statutory language and discussion 
reflected this emphasis on the modern harm principle91—as did the substantially 
similar provisions regarding the harm principle enacted in Alabama, Alaska, 
85  See, e.g., Dworkin (1966) 996; L Henkin, ‘Morals and The Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity,’ 63 Columbia 
Law Review  391 (1963) 413. 
86 R P George, ‘Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-Devlin 
Debate,’ 35 American Journal of Jurisprudence  15 (1990) 30. 
87 J G Murphy, ‘Legal Moralism and Liberalism,’ 37 Arizona Law Review 73 (1995) 74-75. 
88 See, e.g., H Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 267 and 296; M Paulsen and S H Kadish, 
Criminal Law and Its Processes (1st edition 1962) 1-17; R Perkins and R Boyce, Criminal Law (1982) 12; P 
Robinson, Criminal Law (1997) 131.   
89 H Wechsler, ‘Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code,’ 68 Columbia L. Rev. 
1425 (1968) 1432. 
90 Ibid.  
91 See, e.g., MPCC 1985:1.02(1)(a) and MPCOD 1985:Note 14; MPCOD 1985:16; MPCOD 1985:17; MPCOD 
1985:196; MPCOD 1985:458; MPCOD 1985:369; MPCOD 1985:482; MPCOD 1985:190. 
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Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington, among other states.  
 
3. Proliferation: The rise of the modern harm principle in criminal law gave way, in the 
1980s and 1990s to a proliferation of harm arguments across the political spectrum, 
especially at first among those advocating for prohibition. Armed with social science 
studies, with empirical data and with anecdotal evidence, the proponents of regulation 
and enforcement shed the 1960s rhetoric of legal moralism and adopted, instead, 
harm arguments: Catharine MacKinnon focused on the multiple harms to women and 
women’s sexuality caused by pornography; the proponents of the ‘broken windows 
theory’ emphasized how minor disorder, like prostitution and loitering, cause major 
crimes, neighborhood decline, and urban decay; the harm associated with the spread 
of AIDS was used to justify increased regulation of sexual conduct; a new 
temperance movement in Chicago and the quality-of-life initiative in New York City 
focused on the harmful effect of liquor establishments and public drunks on 
neighborhoods and property values; the debate over the legalization of drugs focused 
on the harms caused by drug use. There emerged what can only be described as a 
proliferation of prohibitionist harm arguments aimed at satisfying the modern harm 
principle. To be sure, as Anders Walker correctly points out, the proliferation of harm 
arguments was not entirely new;92 ‘reformers like Anthony Comstock,’ Walker points 
out, ‘began to enlist harm arguments in the regulation of illicit sex as early as 1872, 
not long after Mill finished On Liberty.93 And so, for example, ‘Among the physical 
effects that Comstock focused on was pornography’s tendency to encourage the “fatal 
habit of masturbation,” a physical and psychological “debility.”’94 But the 
proliferation in the late twentieth century was so uniquely extensive and wide-ranging 
that it would have an impact on the stability of the modern harm principle.  
 
4. Collapse: The proliferation of harm arguments, on both sides of the debates—not just 
over prostitution and homosexuality, but also over alcohol and drug consumption, 
loitering, gambling, pornography, and adultery—has effectively collapsed the simple 
harm principle. ‘Harm to others’ is no longer today a limiting principle because it, by 
itself, no longer excludes categories of moral vice from the scope of the law. It no 
longer discriminates because there are so many non-trivial harm arguments. Instead 
of focusing on whether certain conduct causes harm, today the debates center on the 
types of harm, the amounts of harm, comparisons of harms, and our willingness, as a 
society, to bear the harms. And the harm principle is silent on those questions—silent 
in the sense that it does not determine whether a non-trivial harm justifies restrictions 
on liberty, nor does it determine how to compare or weigh competing claims of 
harms. It does not address the comparative importance of harms.  
92 Walker, (2013) 19-20.  
93 Ibid. 20. 
94 Ibid.  
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The Collapse of the Harm Principle documents in detail the proliferation of prohibitionist 
harm arguments throughout different contemporary debates, ranging from pornography and 
prostitution, to homosexuality and fornication, to drug use and alcohol consumption.95 It shows 
how liberal theorists responded by claiming even greater harm, and demonstrates how that cycle 
ultimately collapsed the modern harm principle. The clearest example involves the case of illicit 
drugs, where the arguments for and against prohibition have produced a kind of harm-ratchet that 
has effectively neutered the harm principle. The liberal position in the 1960s and early 1970s was 
characterized by the argument that marijuana use was essentially a ‘victimless’ crime—that it 
caused no ‘harm to others.’96 That early progressive argument was countered in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s by a campaign against drug use that emphasized the harms to society and 
justified an all-out ‘War on Drugs.’ This prohibitionist turn to harm disarmed the traditional 
liberal position, forcing the progressives to turn to arguments about ‘harm reduction’: The term 
‘harm reduction,’ crafted in the early 1990s as an alternative to ‘legalization,’ was a direct 
response to the conservative harm arguments, but at the same time a ratcheting of those harm 
arguments. ‘Harm reduction,’ according to its leading proponent, is ‘a policy that seeks to reduce 
the negative consequences of both drug use and drug prohibition, acknowledging that both are 
likely to persist for the foreseeable future.’97 In response to that, the proponents of the ‘War on 
Drugs’ argued even greater harm: ‘The so-called harm-reduction approach to drugs confuses 
people with terminology. All drug policies claim to reduce harm. No reasonable person 
advocates a position consciously designed to be harmful. The real question is which policies 
actually decrease harm and increase good. The approach advocated by people who say they 
favor ‘harm reduction’ would in fact harm Americans.’98 As a result, today, both prohibitionists 
and legalizers make harm arguments. The debate is over which harms are worse. And on that 
question, the modern harm principle is entirely silent.  
V. Recent Developments in the Area of Same-Sex Sexual Conduct and Marriage 
Rather than continue further to refine the collapse of the modern harm principle 
argument, it may be useful to focus on more recent developments in one specific area—namely 
same-sex sexual conduct and marriage—to show the continuing vitality of the thesis. Recent 
developments in this area demonstrate well that the proliferation of harm arguments is still going 
strong and, once again, eviscerating the modern harm principle.    
Mill himself did not address the prohibition on same-sex sexual conduct in On Liberty or 
elsewhere—to the best of my knowledge—although commentators tend to marshal his writings 
on liberty in support of deregulation and decriminalization—in favor of disenforcement.99 
H.L.A. Hart, naturally, directly addressed the question in response to Devlin’s provocation, in 
Law, Liberty, and Morality, and came down staunchly against prohibition, arguing both that the 
claim that homosexuality causes social harm has no empirical foundation and that the prohibition 
95 Harcourt (1999) 139-183. 
96 See, e.g., H Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 338; J Kaplan, Marijuana—The New Prohibition 
(1970) 
97 E A Nadelmann, Learning to Live With Drugs, Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1999, at A21. 
98 B R McCaffrey, Don’t Legalize Those Drugs, Washington Post, June 29, 1999, at A15 (emphasis added). 
99 See, e.g., P Singer, “Homosexuality is Not Immoral,’ Project Syndicate, October 2006.  
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itself inflicts unnecessary suffering on individuals. On the question of harm, Hart protested, ‘no 
evidence is produced…. As a proposition of fact it is entitled to no more respect than the 
Emperor Justinian’s statement that homosexuality was the cause of earthquakes.’100 Other liberal 
theorists agreed with Hart and sounded the same refrain: as Ronald Dworkin suggested, 
‘[Devlin] manages this conclusion without offering evidence that homosexuality presents any 
danger at all to society’s existence....”101 The tragic advent of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, 
however, changed things, and the threat of AIDS soon became the harm that justified increased 
regulation; this became immediately apparent in the debate over the closing of gay bathhouses at 
the time of the outbreak of the AIDS epidemic.102  
 
At the heart of the AIDS outbreak in 1986, the United States Supreme Court would adopt 
a legal moralist position regarding homosexual sodomy, declaring in Bowers v. Hardwick that 
moral sentiments against homosexuality provided a rational basis for enforcing Georgia’s 
criminal ban.103 Justice Byron White declared for the Court, in Hardwick, that the criminal law is 
constantly, and may properly be, ‘based on notions of morality.’104 But twelve years later, with 
the epidemic somewhat under control and changed social circumstances, the Supreme Court 
would reverse course and, in Lawrence v. Texas, strike down Texas’s anti-sodomy law.105 This 
time it was Justice John Paul Stevens’s declaration, from his dissent in Hardwick, that governed: 
“the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.”106  
 
What is important for present purposes, though, is not how the Court ruled in Hardwick 
or Lawrence, but rather that in both cases—as well as in the more recent controversy over same-
sex marriage—there are harm arguments advanced on both sides of the debates and that the 
modern harm principle offers no guidance as to how to resolve the competing claims of harm. 
This is most evident in the recent debates over same-sex marriage—decidedly not a criminal law 
matter, but bearing the same relation to the government’s legitimate role in regulating—or 
deregulating—moral norms surrounding the family.  
 
 The Supreme Court’s recent opinion regarding a challenge to Section 3 of DOMA is a 
case on point, a decision in which battling claims of harm ultimately neutralize the effect of the 
harm principle. As noted, the case, United States v. Windsor, involved a challenge to Section 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), passed in 1996, which defined ‘marriage’ for purposes of 
all federal legislation as ‘only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife,’ and the word ‘spouse’ as ‘a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.’107 By 
means of this enforceable definition, Congress intended to deny to same-sex couples, lawfully 
100 Hart (1963) 50.  
101 Dworkin (1966) 992; see also Murphy (1995) 77. 
102 See Harcourt (1999) 161-167.  
103 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) 196. 
104 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). 
105 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
106 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2483 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
107 DOMA, 110 Stat. 2419, Section 3.  
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married in states that permit same-sex marriage, any of the federal benefits or rights provided to 
married couples under federal law. The Supreme Court ultimately held in Windsor that Congress 
had overstepped its authority in defining ‘marriage’ and that the States should be the ones who 
define marriage. The Court majority ruled on the grounds of due process and equal protection, 
but what is clear from the dueling opinions is that the notion of harm was at the very heart of the 
debate—and on both sides of the argument. There are dueling theories of harm at play.   
 
 Justice Samuel Alito, in his dissenting opinion, expressed the new, prohibitionist harm 
arguments against same-sex marriage—or more appropriately, the risks of harm. ‘The family is 
an ancient and universal human institution,’ Alito emphasized. ‘Family structure reflects the 
characteristics of a civilization, and changes in family structure and in the popular understanding 
of marriage and the family can have profound effects.’ These changes, Alito emphasized can 
have ‘far-reaching consequences. But the process by which such consequences come about is 
complex, involving the interaction of numerous factors, and tends to occur over an extended 
period of time.’ Alito warned: ‘We can expect something similar to take place if same-sex 
marriage becomes widely accepted. The long-term consequences of this change are not now 
known and are unlikely to be ascertainable for some time to come.’ Alito added in a footnote that 
‘As sociologists have documented, it sometimes takes decades to document the effects of social 
changes—like the sharp rise in divorce rates following the advent of no-fault divorce—on 
children and society,’ and cited a study about the ‘Unexpected Legacy of Divorce.’108 Alito 
continued: ‘At present, no one—including social scientists, philosophers, and historians—can 
predict with any certainty what the long-term ramifications of widespread acceptance of same-
sex marriage will be.’ Alito’s tone is ominous, and even though he is essentially arguing for 
deference to the democratic process, the dice are somewhat loaded and the harm arguments are 
clear.  
 
On the other side of the debate, harm played an equally central role: Congress had 
intended to harm same-sex couples, and the Court needed to protect them from that harm. As 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, ‘The Constitution’s guarantee of equality “must at the 
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot” 
justify disparate treatment of that group.’109 Justice Kennedy’s opinion stresses the harms of 
DOMA to same-sex couples. DOMA, Kennedy wrote, ‘brings financial harm to children of 
same-sex couples. It raises the cost of health care for families by taxing health benefits provided 
by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces benefits allowed to 
families upon the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are an integral part of family 
security.’ The opinion is all about harms.  ‘Under DOMA,’ Kennedy emphasized, ‘same-sex 
married couples have their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible and public 
ways.’ DOMA ‘prevents same-sex married couples from obtaining government healthcare 
benefits they would otherwise receive;’ it ‘deprives them of the Bankruptcy Code’s special 
protections for domestic-support obligations;’ ‘it forces them to follow a complicated procedure 
to file their state and federal taxes jointly;’ and ‘It prohibits them from being buried together in 
108 J Wallerstein, J Lewis, & S Blakeslee, ‘The Unexpected Legacy of Divorce: The 25 Year Landmark Study’ 
(2000). 
109 Windsor, __ (emphasis added). 
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veterans’ cemeteries.’ ‘For certain married couples,’ Kennedy went on, ‘DOMA’s unequal 
effects are even more serious,’ depriving them of the federal protections against domestic 
violence and other safeguards of federal criminal law. Kennedy’s opinion is steeped in harm: 
‘What has been explained to this point should more than suffice to establish that the principal 
purpose and the necessary effect of this law are to demean those persons who are in a lawful 
same-sex marriage. This requires the Court to hold, as it now does, that DOMA is 
unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment 
of the Constitution.’ 
 
 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts tried to neutralize Kennedy’s harm arguments, 
writing that there is ‘hardly enough’ evidence ‘to support a conclusion that the “principal 
purpose” of the 342 Representatives and 85 Senators who voted for it, and the President who 
signed it, was a bare desire to harm.’110 Roberts then himself turns the harm tables: ‘At least 
without some more convincing evidence that the Act’s principal purpose was to codify malice, 
and that it furthered no legitimate government interests, I would not tar the political branches 
with the brush of bigotry.’111 
 
Justice Scalia joined in as well, mitigating Kennedy’s harm arguments. The evidence of 
other justifying rationales for DOMA—that is, besides intentionally wanting to harm same-sex 
couples—‘give the lie to the Court’s conclusion that only those with hateful hearts could have 
voted “aye” on this Act.’ As Scalia emphasized, ‘it is harder to maintain the illusion of the Act’s 
supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob when one first describes their views 
as they see them.’ Scalia declared: ‘the majority says that the supporters of this Act acted with 
malice—with the “purpose” “to disparage and to injure” same-sex couples. It says that the 
motivation for DOMA was to “demean;” to “impose inequality;” to “impose ... a stigma;” to 
deny people “equal dignity;” to brand gay people as “unworthy;” and to “humiliat[e]” their 
children (emphasis added). I am sure these accusations are quite untrue.’ And then, in closing, 
once again, Scalia raised the specter of polygamy—though not bestiality this time. ‘It is enough 
to say that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to approve of same-sex 
marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or 
the consumption of alcohol.’112  
 
The Court ultimately ruled in favor of the same-sex marriage position in the DOMA case, 
giving voice to the harm that the DOMA inflicts on same-sex couples. The opinions are dressed 
in constitutional discourse, but it is really harm that is at play. One can favor the result, or object 
to it—that, I think, for present purposes, is irrelevant. What is relevant and telling is that the real 
battle is between harms, that both sides of the debate are throwing around harm arguments, and 
that the decision ultimately rests on who is more convincing on comparative harms, not whether 
there is ‘harm to others.’ In that debate, the modern harm principle has no role. It is a debate that 
is vulnerable to the greatest demagoguery, mass public appeal, and social pressure. It reverts the 
110 United States v. Windsor (Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting), __.  
111 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
112 United States v. Windsor (J. SCALIA, dissenting).  
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most important questions about the protection of the individual to the kind of rhetorical and 
popular debates that Mill would have avoided at all cost. The problem, in effect, is that the 
simple notion of ‘harm to others,’ as Mill had warned us, is not up to the task. By returning to 
that simple notion of harm, the liberals first, but the legal moralists second, and then both in 
ratcheted cycles, have essentially gutted the limiting principle that Mill began to develop. They 
have functionally neutralized the modern harm principle as a critical limiting principle.  
 
Conclusion 
 Liberal thinkers in the twentieth century sapped Mill’s limiting principle of its strength 
by returning to ‘harm to others.’ What we are left with today is not a limiting harm principle, but 
rather harm decisionism. And that, more than anything, opens the way precisely to the threat of 
‘social tyranny’113 that Mill feared and tried to protect against. H.L.A. Hart was certainly right 
when he wrote that ‘For Mill, these dangers were part of the price to be paid for all that is so 
valuable in democratic government. He thought the price certainly worth paying; but he was 
much concerned to remind the supporters of democracy of the danger and the need for 
vigilance.’114 Mill tried to protect us from these dangers by elaborating on protected interests and 
legal rights in furtherance of a vision of individual diversity, creativity, and self-development—
but his project was undermined by his own followers in the twentieth century. It is questionable 
whether Mill’s unique approach would have had more success. It is not at all clear that Mill’s 
notion of legal rights would offer greater determinacy than the notion of ‘harm to others.” In the 
end, it is perhaps only ‘the need for vigilance,’ as Hart phrased it, that can best protect liberal 
democracy.  
113 Mill (1978) 4. 
114 Hart (1963) 78.  
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